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Abstract We consider the problem of coordination via signaling in network
congestion games to improve social welfare deteriorated by incomplete
information about traffic flow. Traditional studies on signaling, which focus
on exogenous factors of congestion and ignore congestion externalities, fail
to discuss the oscillations of traffic flow. To address this gap, we formulate
a problem of designing a coordination signal on endogenous information
about traffic flow and introduce a self-fulfilling characteristic of a signal that
guarantees an outcome flow consistent with the signal itself without causing
the unwanted oscillation. An instance of the self-fulfilling signal is shown
in the case of a Gaussian signal distribution. In addition, we show simple
numerical examples. The results reveal how a self-fulfilling signal suppresses
the oscillation and simultaneously improves social welfare through improved
network efficiency.
Keywords Network Congestion Games · Coordination · Signaling ·
Endogenous Information · Oscillation · ATIS
1 Introduction
Network congestion games (also called selfish routing games) model route
choice behaviors of self-interested agents on a graph. One prominent
application of network congestion games is in the studies on routing in
transportation or telecommunication networks. These studies conclude that
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selfish behaviors by agents cause congestion and inefficiency in a network
(Roughgarden 2005). Therefore, the coordination problem emerges among
selfish agents to mitigate the inefficient use of the network and improve overall
social welfare.
One way to realize such coordination is to charge tolls on the congested
edges (Yang and Huang 1998). However, most previous studies are based on
the assumption that agents have complete information on other agent types
and can therefore predict the flow of all edges in equilibrium. In contrast,
agents sometimes make incorrect decisions in real situations because they do
not have information regarding other agents in the network and regarding
which routes are congested at any given moment. In such a case, incomplete
information causes inefficiency (Angeletos and Pavan 2005).
Signaling is a possible solution to eliminate the inefficiency arising from
incomplete information by sending signals to agents to provide traffic flow
information for all edges. When applied to transportation networks, car
navigation systems or smartphones can be used to implement signals. However,
this solution is not comprehensive because difficulties also arise due to
congestion externalities. Since traffic flow is an endogenous variable of the
game, a signal about a flow can change the outcome of the flow itself.
For example, if a car navigation system reports that one of two routes is
congested, agents will then choose the other route, which in turn is likely to
become congested due to higher traffic volumes. This results in congestion
oscillating between routes, which is called oscillation of traffic flow or hunting
phenomenon (Klein et al. 2005; Fukuda et al. 2002; Wahlea et al. 2002). This
oscillation generates outcome flows that differ from those informed by the
signal, thus turning the system into an inadvertent liar.
Designing a traffic flow signal that results in the same flow outcome as
the pre-committed signal is necessary to avoid the oscillation. This signal is
referred to as a self-fulfilling signal as it has the capacity to realize an outcome
equal to the signal itself. Our goal is to design a self-fulfilling signal that
mitigates the inefficiency caused by incomplete traffic flow information.
1.1 Our Contributions and Paper Structure
We examine a self-fulfilling signal in a network congestion game to mitigate
inefficiency caused by incomplete information. Our contribution is threefold.
First, we formulate the problem of designing a self-fulfilling signal for
an endogenous game variable. This problem formulation is general and
includes many applications that have endogenous variables with incomplete
information. Second, we show an instance of an asymmetric Gaussian signal
that has self-fulfilling capability in multicommodity, atomic, and unweighted
network congestion games with affine cost functions and Gaussian priors.
This result provides a new alternative of endogenous information to the
signaling scheme. Third, we employ examples of congestion games to verify
the performance of a self-fulfilling signal in mitigating inefficiency caused by
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incomplete information. The results indicate the possibilities of coordination
by signaling with endogenous information.
Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 illustrates our main results
regarding self-fulfilling signals in network congestion games. Section 4 describes
numerical examples and their results.
1.2 Related Works
The idea of Wardrop’s User Equilibrium (UE) and System Optimum
(SO) (Wardrop 1952) has been studied in the field of transportation,
telecommunication networks and game theory (Altman and Wynter 2004).
Since Rosenthal first introduced congestion games (Rosenthal 1973), many
varieties of derivative games have been proposed, and significant results have
been obtained regarding inefficiencies in equilibrium (see e.g., (Roughgarden
2005; Yang et al. 2008, 2016)) as well as regarding coordination of agents
to optimize social welfare (see e.g., (Christodoulou et al. 2009)). However,
most such studies assume complete information about traffic flow to calculate
equilibria. A review of previous related studies reveals that the most popular
coordination mechanism is toll collection (Yang and Huang 1998; Friesz et al.
2004). However, this approach introduces costs associated with establishing
the collection infrastructure as well as requires charging responsibilities.
Coordination between agents and emergence of consensus are also topics
that have been extensively researched. Consensus algorithms (Olfati-Saber et
al. 2007), El Farol bar problems (Arthur 1994), minority games (Challet and
Zhang 1997), and multiagent Markov decision process (Littman 2001) are all
examples of coordination problems among autonomous agents without any
coordinator. These studies assume the involvement of a constant set of agents
and that these agents iteratively play the same game, updating their strategies
to avoid conflicts with other agents through reinforcement learning. However,
scenarios also exist wherein agents fail to learn coordinated strategies.
Former studies showed that reinforcement learning becomes computationally
intractable and algorithm may not converge when agents do not have full
observation of whole states, such as traffic of all edges (Goldman and
Zilberstein 2004; Kaelbling et al. 1996; Zhang and Lesser 2012). In an extreme
case wherein agents experience the game only once, such as when they drive to
popular leisure venue on vacation, they do not have the opportunity to learn
road traffic iteratively.
Coordination problems with a mediator have also been examined in
leader-follower games (Tharakunnel 2008) and Stackelberg games (Stanˇkova´
et al. 2006). In these studies, a leader makes a decision that affects followers’
rewards such that followers are motivated to coordinate. However, most of
these studies assume complete information on the state of the environment
and that both the leader and followers can observe the state. This is not
always true in real road networks.
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Recently, a new coordinating approach has been proposed where a
mediator utilizes private information as a signal to persuade agents and
realize coordination (Gentzkow and Kamenica 2011). Since this new signaling
approach does not require infrastructure such as toll collections and thus is free
from the associated initial costs, it has the potential to be quickly implemented
in a range of applications, especially on the basis of widespread smartphone
technologies or upcoming intelligent vehicles connected to the Internet. For
example, (Kremer et al. 2014) demonstrated an application of signaling to
road networks. A sender collects traffic flow information for each road from
individual drivers and subsequently sends all drivers collated information that
pertains to their route choices. However, these studies assume that traffic
flow is an exogenous variable and neglect congestion externalities that cause
the oscillation of traffic flow. Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and
Morris 2013) is a signaling technique that is able to manage externalities.
However, it assumes that a signal is exogenous information and not endogenous
information such as traffic flow.
The oscillations of the game outcome have been examined in the context
of stability analysis of repeated games with the theory of Nash dynamics
(Fabrikant and Papadimitriou 2008) or evolutionary game theory (Hauert
and Szabo´ 2005; Zhang et al. 2015). However, these studies are based on
games among autonomous agents without any coordinators. (Nakayama 2009)
concluded that drivers’ observation errors accumulate through iterations in
selfish routing under incomplete information and the traffic flow disperses
over a network and becomes stable autonomously. However, this result seems
optimistic when compared with reality. (Klein et al. 2005) employs noisy
signaling to manage the oscillation. However, their approach is heuristic and
the performance is not guaranteed by a theory. (Bottom 2000) formulated
the oscillation problem as the anticipatory route guidance problem. They use
variable message signs (VMS) to send drivers full traffic information. The
information is limited only to drivers who pass through the nodes with VMS.
This information control splits traffic into several paths and suppresses the
oscillation. However, the information control is not flexible compared with the
signaling approach that allows partial information disclosure with arbitrary
signal distributions. (Engelson 1997) proposed a deterministic version of our
self-fulfilling signal approach. However, such a deterministic signal sometimes
causes unstable traffic and fails to suppress oscillation as shown in the later
section of this paper. There are other studies on advanced traveler information
systems (ATIS) that suppress the oscillation problem (Ben-Akiva et al. 2001;
Paz and Peeta 2009). However, their simulation-based approach are not
analytical and do not guarantee the convergence of oscillations. Studies on
traffic engineering reveal that the oscillation can actually be observed in real
road networks (Fukuda et al. 2002; Kanamori et al. 2012). Their approach
against the oscillation is also heuristic and evaluated by a simulation in a
specific case.
Despite the inroads made by the studies above, the oscillation remains an
open problem. We therefore propose a novel theoretical approach for managing
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this open real-world issue in this study. We consider situations such that agents
do not have full observability, and then have biased beliefs on traffic as a result
of imprecise adaptive learning.
2 The Model
2.1 Network Congestion Game
This section introduces the atomic, singleton, and unweighted network
congestion game examined in this study. A network congestion game is defined
by a tuple Γ = (N ,G, C,K), where
– N denotes a finite set of agents where |N | = n and an agent i ∈ N .
– G = (V, E) is a graph where |E| = m and an edge e ∈ E .
– ce ∈ C : R≥0 → R≥0 denotes a cost function of an edge e.
– K = V×V denotes a finite set of origin-destination (OD) pairs. k = (o, d) ∈
K is a pair, and ki = (oi, di) ∈ K is a pair of agent i. nk = |{ki : ki = k}|
denotes the number of agents whose pair is k.
A game is called a single-commodity flow problem (Christodoulou et al.
2009) when |K| = 1 or a multi-commodity flow problem when |K| ≥ 2. We
assume that OD pair k is connected by Mk ≥ 1 paths (or routes). A route
is denoted by rk ∈ Rk , where Rk denotes a finite set of routes that have
an OD pair k. A set of all possible routes for K is denoted by R = ∪
k∈K
Rk
and |R| = M . We consider a singleton routing game in which each agent is
restricted to choosing a single route. Accordingly, the strategy set of agent i
is Ai = Rki and the set of strategy profiles is A = ×
i∈N
Ai.
Given a strategy profile a ∈ A, the set of users of route r is denoted by
Sr(a) = {i ∈ N : r = ai ∈ Ai}. Similarly, the set of users of edge e is denoted
by Se(a) = {i ∈ N : r = ai, e is on r}. In addition, we define a route choice
matrix X(a) = [xir] corresponding to the strategy profile, the elements of
which are denoted by Kronecker delta as
xir =
{
1 if ai = r,
0 otherwise.
(1)
In the remainder of the study, the argument a is subject to be omitted.
The flow on route r is calculated by
hr = |Sr| =
∑
i∈N
xir. (2)
The flow for all routes is denoted by h = (h1, ..., hM )
T ∈ H = RM≥0.
Similarly, the flow on edge e is fe = |Se| and f = (f1, ..., fm)T ∈ F = Rm≥0.
The occurrence of edges on a route is specified by the edge-route incidence
matrix D = [δer] such that
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δer =
{
1 if e is on r,
0 otherwise.
(3)
Then the relation of flow between edges and routes is denoted by
f = Dh. (4)
Let the cost of all edges be c = (c1(f), ..., cm(f)), the cost of routes φ =
(φ1, ..., φM ) can thus be calculated as
φ = cD. (5)
For simplicity, we use a linear Gaussian model for Bayesian inference in
the rest of the paper (see Appendix A) and assume an affine cost function
c(f) = Λf + b throughout.
2.2 Incomplete Information and Signaling
In network congestion games, agents select routes that minimize their expected
costs. However, we examine a problem wherein agents do not have complete
information regarding the types of other agents and cannot predict equilibrium
traffic flow. In such a case, agents try to minimize their expected costs based
on their subjective probability distributions of traffic flow. We refer to this
subjective probability distribution as belief. For simplicity, we use a Gaussian
distribution throughout. The prior belief of agent i is denoted by
p0i(f) = N(f ;µ0i,Σ0) (6)
where N(f ;µ,Σ) is the multivariate Gaussian probability density function of
f with mean vector µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ. Σ0 is a common
parameter to all agents. The parameter µ0i ∈ F differs for each agent, and
is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) by being sampled from the
following distribution
p(µ0i) = N(µ0i;µh,Σh) (7)
where µh ∈ F and Σh are parameters common to all agents.
Since agents do not possess accurate information on traffic flow, their
beliefs are biased and thus cause inefficiency in the network usage. This study
examines a problem of a coordinator who sends asymmetric signals about
traffic flow to agents to improve traffic efficiency. Following (Gentzkow and
Kamenica 2011), we call the coordinator who sends the signal a sender and
use the term receivers for agents who receive these signals. For coordination
within the network, the sender commits to send an asymmetric signal s ∈ F
that follows the conditional distribution
pi(s|f) = N(s;f ,Σs). (8)
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In a transportation problem, this means that the sender announces traffic
information of all edges. It may be shown, for example, in a smartphone road
map.
However, the sender cannot observe traffic flow f because it is an outcome
of the game (endogenous variable). Therefore, the sender must determine the
signals to be sent following the distribution independent of the traffic flow
p(s) = N(s;µs,Σs) (9)
where µs ∈ F and Σs are parameters to be determined by the sender.
After receiving the signal, each receiver updates his belief according to the
sender’s commitment and Bayes’ law as follows:
pi(f |s) = pi(s|f)p0i(f)∫
pi(s|f)p0i(f)df . (10)
A receiver then selects a route that minimizes expected costs as follows:
ai = arg min
r∈Ai
E[φr(f)|s], (11)
where
E[φr(f)|s] =
∫
pi(f |s)φr(f)df . (12)
Since the expected cost E[φr(f)|s] depends upon the posterior belief in
(10), the sender can control route choices of receivers and the outcome flow
fˆ ∈ F .
However, if the signal is not conditional on the outcome flow fˆ as
committed in (8), the sender becomes an inadvertent liar. Aggravating the
situation, this causes a discrepancy between signal and outcome flow, resulting
in the emergence of the oscillations.
2.3 Our Problem
Our problem in this study is therefore to design a signal distribution p(s) that
realizes an outcome consistent with commitment (8). This is formulated in
general as follows.
Definition 1 (Self-fulfilling condition) A signal s is self-fulfilling if and only
if a commitment of the signal distribution is conditional on the outcome of an
endogenous variable fˆ :
s ∼ pi(s|fˆ). (13)
If a signal s satisfies this condition, receivers can trust the commitment
pi(s|f) and can calculate (10). Since the signal s cannot cause an increase of
the expected cost E[φr(f)|s], receivers make decisions on the basis of (11),
which can be controlled by the signal. Thus, our goal is to design a signal
distribution p(s) that meets (13).
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2.4 Iteration of Games
Thus far, we have considered only one-shot games. In some later sections, we
will examine the case of repeated games wherein the signal is determined
according to the outcome of the previous game to meet the self-fulfilling
condition. In each iteration t ∈ [1, ..., τ ], the strategy profile, route choice
matrix, flow of edges and routes, and cost of edges and routes are denoted by
at, Xt, f t, ht, ct and φt, respectively. Through each iteration, the game Γ
remains constant.
Since vehicles in a road network constantly change, we assume short-lived
and myopic receivers who exist only in one game and are entirely replaced
in the next game. This assumption is denoted by constant priors (6) and a
constant knowledge of signal accuracy (8), which means that receivers already
have fixed beliefs and do not update them in iterations. Though this is a radical
assumption, yet it is reasonable to model the traffic on weekends, so that the
people visiting the places for the first time do not have any chance to update
their knowledge. The assumption also models an aspect of weekday-traffic,
wherein drivers do not have full observability of the entire traffic in the whole
network. The assumption means that drivers have already learnt from everyday
traffic experience before the signaling iterations. Owing to the intractability of
reinforcement learning under partial observability (Goldman and Zilberstein
2004; Kaelbling et al. 1996; Zhang and Lesser 2012), their strategies have been
trapped into a local minimum, which is different from Wardrop equilibria,
and their knowledge regarding traffic remains incomplete. Though learning
dynamics amid local observability can converge to Wardrop equilibria in the
case of linear cost functions (Barth et al. 2008), yet it does not hold in
general. If the learning dynamics does not converge to Wardrop equilibria,
then each driver can only have vague and biased knowledge as a constant
prior in consequence of day-to-day traffic experiences.
Once a signaling system starts functioning, the sender determines signals
based on the constant priors throughout the iterations. The drivers know that
the outcome traffic is controlled by the self-fulfilling signals as committed in
advance. Hence, they cannot learn about the “natural” traffic without any
influence of the signals. Accordingly, the drivers cannot update their priors,
which are unconditional on the signals, through the iterations.
In repeated games, the sender determines a signal st based on the constant
priors and the observation of the previous outcome flow fˆ
t−1
. The outcome of
a current game fˆ
t
is determined by the current signal st.
3 Self-Fulfilling Signal
The method to design a self-fulfilling signal depends on whether the sender has
knowledge of receivers’ priors. In this section, we sequentially describe both
cases.
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3.1 One-Shot Game: Known Prior Case
In the case where the sender knows receivers’ priors, the self-fulfilling signal can
be determined according to these priors. Given the game Γ , it is possible for the
sender to predict the receivers’ choices and the outcome flow fˆ corresponding
to the sender’s signal p(s). Hence, the sender can determine a signal such that
the outcome fˆ becomes spontaneously consistent with the signal.
The following lemma indicates how to predict the outcome flow
corresponding to a given signal.
Lemma 1 The outcome flow of single-commodity with affine cost functions
is given by
fˆ = nD[cdf(0;µr,Σr)]
T , (14)
where cdf(y;µ,Σ) is the multivariate normal cumulative distribution function
and µr and Σr are defined in (27).
Proof When a receiver receives a signal s, the posterior belief of the receiver
is calculated from (6) and (8) by Bayes’ law (10). The summary of Bayesian
inference for linear Gaussian model is described in Appendix A. The posterior
belief is denoted by
pi(f |s) = N(f ;µis,Σ), (15)
where
µis = Σ(Σ
−1
s s+Σ
−1
0 µ0i)
Σ = (Σ−1s +Σ
−1
0 )
−1.
(16)
The signal s follows the distribution given in (9). Hence, s in the posterior
belief above is marginalized out as
pi(f) =
∫
pi(f |s)p(s)ds = N(f ;µi,Σ1) (17)
where
µi = ΣΣ
−1
s µs +ΣΣ
−1
0 µ0i
Σ1 = Σ +Σ(ΣΣ
−1
s )
T .
(18)
The mean parameter of the prior µ0i follows the distribution in (7). Hence,
µ0i in the above belief is also marginalized out as
p(f) =
∫
pi(f)p(µ0i)dµ0i = N(f ;µ,Σ), (19)
where
µ = ΣΣ−1s µs +ΣΣ
−1
0 µh
Σ = Σ1 + (ΣΣ
−1
0 )Σh(ΣΣ
−1
0 )
T .
(20)
With an affine cost function of c(f) = Λf + b, the distribution of the edge
cost is then
p(c) = N(c;Λµ+ b,ΛΣΛT ). (21)
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From (5), the distribution of the route cost becomes
p(φ) = N(φ;µφ,Σφ), (22)
where
µφ = (Λµ+ b)D
Σφ = D
T (ΛΣΛT )D.
(23)
The receivers’ choices are based on this cost distribution. Let µφ,r be the
element of µφ for route r. The receiver’s problem (11) is then rewritten as
ai = arg min
r∈A0
µφ,r. (24)
Since this is a single-commodity game, the strategy set of all receivers is
identical, denoted by A0. The probability of a receiver to selecting route r
is pr = P (ai = r) = P (µφ,r ≤ µφ,−r) where −r = {r′ : r′ ∈ A0, r′ 6= r}
denotes all routes except for r. Here, let Br = [βj,l] denote a matrix for cost
comparison between route r and other routes such that
βj,l =
1 if l = r,−1 if l = −r[j]
0 otherwise
(25)
where j ∈ [|A0| − 1], l ∈ [|A0|]. Then, pr is denoted with this matrix as pr =
P (Brφ ≤ 0). The distribution of differential cost is
p(Brφ) = N(Brφ;µr,Σr), (26)
where
µr = Brµφ
Σr = BrΣφB
T
r .
(27)
Then the probability of route choice is
pr = P (Brφ ≤ 0) = cdf(0;µr,Σr). (28)
Meanwhile, the outcome flow of route r is calculated from (2). If the number
of receivers n is sufficiently large, the law of large numbers gives
hˆr =
∑
i∈N xir = nE[xir] = nP{ai = r} = npr
= n ∗ cdf(0;µr,Σr).
(29)
Accordingly, the flow of all routes is hˆ = n[cdf(0;µr,Σr)]. From (4), (14) is
obtained. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. uunionsq
For multi-commodity games, the following lemma gives the outcome
prediction.
Lemma 2 The outcome flow of multi-commodity with affine cost functions
is given by
fˆ = D[cdf(0;µrk,Σrk)]n, (30)
where n = (n1, ..., n|K|)T , and µrk and Σrk are defined in (32).
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Proof Since receiver’s decision depends only on his prior and the signal from
the sender, the probability of route choice prk for each pair k is calculated
independently and similarly as in (28) such that
prk = P (Brkφ ≤ 0) = cdf(0;µrk,Σrk), (31)
where
µrk = Brkµφ
Σrk = BrkΣφB
T
rk.
(32)
Then, the outcome flow of all routes is calculated by summing up the
probabilities
hˆ = [prk]n. (33)
From (4), (30) is obtained. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. uunionsq
Lemma 2 immediately yields the following proposition regarding the
self-fulfilling condition.
Proposition 1 In the case of a network congestion game with Gaussian
signal distribution (9), the following condition is equivalent to the self-fulfilling
condition (13).
µs = D[cdf(0;µrk,Σrk)]n (34)
Proof In the case of Gaussian distribution, the signal distribution conditional
on the outcome is denoted by pi(s|fˆ) = N(s; fˆ ,Σs). The signal actually follows
the distribution in (9). Then, the self-fulfilling condition (13) in the Gaussian
case is denoted by
µs = fˆ . (35)
With Lemma 2, (34) is obtained. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
uunionsq
Now we can obtain a self-fulfilling Gaussian signal as a solution to equation
(34) in the case of known priors. The existence of a solution is guaranteed by
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Regarding (34) as a self-map
µs = g(µs) = D[cdf(0;µrk,Σrk)]n, (36)
there is a solution (fixed point µs0) such that µs0 = g(µs0).
Proof g is a self-map g : F → F . According to (4), F is a linear transformation
of M -dimensional box H and then convex compact. Then, by Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem, the self-map (36) has a fixed point. This completes the
proof of Proposition 2. uunionsq
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3.2 Repeated Games: Unknown Prior Case
Without knowing receivers’ priors, the sender cannot design a self-fulfilling
signal based on Proposition 1. In this case, the sender has to adjust signals to
be self-fulfilling in repeated games. Again, we assume a Gaussian signal but
using the observation of the last outcome,
p(st|f t−1) = N(st;µts,Σs)
µts = f
t−1.
(37)
The sender’s commitment (8) is written as
pi(st|f t) = N(st;f t,Σs). (38)
Then, our goal is to meet a Gaussian version of self-fulfilling condition (35),
which can be rewritten as
µts = f
t. (39)
According to (30), the outcome flow of the current game is the function of
the signal parameters, which is denoted by
f t = g(µts) = D[cdf(0;µrk,Σrk)]n. (40)
Now, we have the following proposition about self-fulfilling signals in
repeated games.
Proposition 3 Let µs0 be a fixed point in a self-map µs = g(µs). The
following condition is sufficient for a signal to converge on µs0 and meet the
self-fulfilling condition (39).
max |λj | < 1 (41)
where J =
∂g
∂µs
is the Jacobian of g(µs) and λ = (λ1, ..., λm) are eigenvalues
of J(µs0).
Proof From (37) and (40), the outcome flow evolves via the following process
f t = g(f t−1). (42)
If the function g has an asymptotic stable fixed point, the outcome flow
converges on that fixed point such that f t = f t−1. Hence with (37), the
self-fulfilling condition (39) is obtained. The sufficient condition that a fixed
point µs0 of the function g becomes asymptotically stable is given by (41)
according to the linearized stability theory (Garcia et al. 1998). This completes
the proof of Proposition 3. uunionsq
In repeated games, a signal that satisfies the condition (39) converges on
the fixed point g and becomes self-fulfilling. Otherwise, the outcome oscillation
occurs. We will confirm this with an example in a later section.
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4 Examples
4.1 Minority Game
In this section, we show a simple numerical example based on a minority
game. A minority game (Challet and Zhang 1997) is a subclass of (network)
congestion games, in which receivers have only two options E = {1, 2}. The
game does not have graph structures, which means that D is a 2× 2 identical
matrix, R = Ai = E and |K| = 1. A game outcome can be denoted with a
scalar variable of population rate ω ∈ [0, 1] as f1 = nω, f2 = n(1−ω). The cost
function is c(ω) = (1 − 2ω, 2ω − 1), which imposes more costs on majorities
and ensures that minorities win. This simple example models situations such
as the choice between two routes. The parameters of receivers’ beliefs and
the sender’s signal in (6),(7) and (9) are also reduced as scalar variables
(µ0i, σ
2
0), (µh, σ
2
h) and (µs, σ
2
s), respectively. The sender aims to minimize the
total cost of receivers, which is |c(ω)|2 = −8(ω − ω2) + 2. Hence, the sender’s
utility can be denoted as the minus cost v(ω) = ω − ω2.
In this setting, the self-fulfilling condition (34) in Proposition 1 is reduced
as follows:
µs = cdf(0;µφ, σ
2
φ) (43)
where
µφ = 2σ
2
(
µs
σ2s
+
µh
σ20
)
σ2φ = 4
(
σ21 +
σ4
σ40
σ2h
)
σ2 =
σ20σ
2
s
σ20+σ
2
s
σ21 = σ
2 +
σ4
σ2s
.
(44)
The sufficient condition (41) for self-fulfillment in the repeated game in
Proposition 3 is given in closed form as
σ2s ≥
−4piσ40 +
√
16pi2σ80 + 8pi(σ
2
0 + σ
2
h)σ
4
0
4pi(σ20 + σ
2
h)
. (45)
Note that the signal parameter in (45) is only variance σ2s .
4.1.1 Known Prior Case
Here, we show a simple numerical example of a known prior case. Parameter
values are shown in Table 1. The mean parameter of receivers’ prior is µh = 0.3,
which means that most receivers believe that route 1 is relatively vacant and
therefore preferable. In the case without signaling, receivers rush to route 1
and the outcome percentage of the population on that route becomes ωˆ = 0.85.
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Table 1 Values of parameters
Parameter Value
µh 0.3
σh 0.2
σ0 0.2
σs 0.22
n 81
no. of signal samples 150
The sender tries to mitigate congestion on route 1 by sending signal s ∈
[0, 1] on endogenous variable ω. The signal is designed to meet the self-fulfilling
condition (43) to suppress the outcome oscillations, which derives the mean
parameter µs = 0.62. The resulting outcome becomes ωˆ = 0.63, indicating
that the signal meeting the self-fulfilling condition successfully realizes the
outcome that equals itself with a slight sampling error. As long as the sender
uses a self-fulfilling signal, the oscillations will always be suppressed.
Figure 1 indicates a comparison of traffic efficiency v(ωˆ) between the case
with signal and the case without a signal. Network efficiency is increased by
signaling, which means that traffic inefficiencies caused by biased priors is
mitigated by sender’s self-fulfilling signal.
Fig. 1 Change in traffic efficiency by a self-fulfilling signal
4.1.2 Unknown Prior Case
Here, we show a numerical example for an unknown prior case. We use the
same parameter values as in Table 1 except for signal deviation σs. Since
the sender does not know receivers’ priors, the signal is determined through
repeated games. We use µs0 = 0.3 as an initial value for the signal mean.
The self-fulfilling condition (45) is σs ≥ 0.2. First, we tested σs = 0.13,
which does not meet the self-fulfilling condition. Figure 2 shows the evolution
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of outcome ωˆ. As the theory indicates, the oscillation occurs due to the
non-self-fulfilling signal.
Fig. 2 Oscillation caused by non-self-fulfilling signal
Next, we tested σs = 0.29, which meets the self-fulfilling condition. Figure
3 shows the result. As the theory indicates, the oscillations are suppressed and
the outcome ωˆ converges on the same value of µs = 0.62, which is given by the
self-fulfilling signal in the known prior case. Hence, the sender can suppress the
oscillations and ensure that the outcome will converge even without knowing
receivers’ priors.
Fig. 3 Convergence of traffic led by a self-fulfilling signal
From a signaling point of view, the results are interesting because the
partial disclosure of flow information as in Figure 3 brings greater efficiency
than in the no-disclosure case shown in Figure 1 or in the full-disclosure case
suffering from the outcome oscillations as in Figure 2.
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4.2 Network Congestion Game
In this section, we show another numerical example based on a network
congestion game. Figure 4 shows a bidirected graph G used in this example,
which is a subset of the network used in (LeBlanc et al. 1975) and has m = 46
edges. There are n = 172 players and |K| = 14 OD pairs which are also shown
in Figure 4. |Rk| = 5 choices for each of the OD pairs, which are the first
five unweighted shortest paths. We use a cost function c(f) = Λf + b. The
parameter Λ is a constant m×m diagonal matrix that has randomly generated
elements Λii ∈ [2, 3], i ∈ {1 . . .m}. The parameter b is a constant vector
that also has randomly generated elements bi ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter Σh is
generated by simulating random route choices 100 times. We letΣ0 = Σh. The
parameter µh is generated by letting driers play a full information repeated
network congestion game that is stopped before converging to an equilibrium.
Fig. 4 Example network
In a manner similar to that in section 4.1.2, we change the signal parameter
Σs and observe how traffic changes through the iterations. The initial µs is
randomly chosen and is updated by (36). Since variance-covariance matrices
are not full rank in this example, we use the dimension reduction technique in
Appendix A for calculations of inverse matrices.
Figure 5 shows the change of normalized traffic f t/‖f t‖1 with unstable
signal Σs1 that is generated in the same way as Σh. Since f
t is
multi-dimensional, the figure shows the first component of the principal
component analysis. The cumulative proportion of the first component is
18.3%. In this case, max |λj | = 2.2 > 1, which does not satisfy the condition
(41) and then causes oscillation. Meanwhile, Figure 6 shows the result with an
asymptotically stable signal Σs2 = 9 ∗Σs1. In this case, max |λj | = 0.65 < 1
and the result quickly converges into a self-fulfilling traffic.
Figure 7 shows network traffic without signal. It seems that most of the
traffic is concentrated on certain edges. Figure 8 shows how self-fulfilling signals
mitigate this problem. It seems that this signal induced traffic from congested
edges to unused edges. Figure 9 indicates a comparison of social cost φh.
Stable self-fulfilling signal successfully reduced social cost compared with the
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Fig. 5 Network oscillation caused by unstable signal
Fig. 6 Convergence of network traffic led by a self-fulfilling signal
Fig. 7 Network traffic without signal
case without signal, whereas unstable signal increased the social cost. The
rightmost bar in Figure 9 shows the social cost of Wardrop’s UE in a complete
information case, wherein drivers have full observability of network traffic
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Fig. 8 Change in network traffic caused by a self-fulfilling signal
Fig. 9 Change in network traffic efficiency by a self-fulfilling signal
without delay. The result of the stable self-fulfilling signal is the closest to
the one of the complete information case.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have shown how to coordinate agents using endogenous
signal. This study formulates the problem of designing a self-fulfilling signal
that suppresses the outcome oscillation and illustrates an instance of such
a signal in a network congestion game. Examples demonstrate that the
proposed technique is effective in coordination of agents and suppression of
the oscillation.
Our theory is based on several assumptions which would be open problems
for the future application to real-world problems. Specifically, following are
interesting extensions:
– Relaxation of the Gaussian prior assumption of receivers’ beliefs
– Consideration of the receivers’ reinforcement learning through repeated
games
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Appendix A Bayesian Inference for linear Gaussian model
Here, we summarize the general results of Bayesian inference for a linear
Gaussian model (Bishop 2006). Let prior Gaussian distribution of x be denoted
by
p(x) = N(x;µ,Λ−1). (46)
In linear Gaussian model, the conditional distribution of y given x has a mean
that is a linear function of x, such as
p(y|x) = N(y;Ax+ b,L−1). (47)
The posterior distribution of x given y is denoted by
p(x|y) = N(x;Σ{ATL(y − b) +Λµ},Σ), (48)
where
Σ = (Λ+ATLA)−1. (49)
The marginal distribution of y is denoted by
p(y) = N(y;Aµ+ b,L−1 +AΛ−1AT ). (50)
If covariance matrices are not full rank, it is impossible to calculate their
inverse matrices. In this case, there exists a linear transformation that reduces
the dimension of vector x and makes its covariance Σ full rank as follows
x˜ = C(x− µ)
Σ˜ = CΣCT .
(51)
This transformation matrix C is obtained by singular value decomposition.
The calculation including inverse matrices can be processed in this reduced
vector space. Let x˜2 be the result. This is converted into the original vector
space by the following reverse transformation
x2 = C
T x˜2 + µ. (52)
